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We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across 
countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a 
domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international 
climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated 
through the climate agreement. With an international agreement controlling 
abatements directly through emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower 
that the socially optimal subsidy. The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate 
agreement does not specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common 
carbon tax. Social costs are higher under a tax agreement than under a quota 
agreement. Moreover, for a reasonable assumption on the abatement cost function, 
R&D investments and abatement levels are lower under a tax agreement than under a 
quota agreement. Total emissions may be higher or lower in a second-best optimal 
quota agreement than in the first-best optimum. 
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1   Introduction 
If dramatic future climate changes are to be avoided, there must be a significant 
reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions compared with the “business as 
usual” development of emissions. Moreover, a significant reduction in global 
greenhouse gas emissions will require (i) cooperation among countries and (ii) 
development of new technology if such reductions are to be achieved without 
excessive costs. The interaction between the design of international climate 
agreements and endogenous technology development is therefore an important 
issue.  
 
Several recent articles have studied interactions between endogenous 
technological change and environmental policy, see e.g. Jaffe et al. (2002) and 
Löschel (2002) for overviews. Most of the contributions dealing explicitly with 
the climate problem neglect interactions between countries, and simply 
consider the world as one unit with a central planner.
1 There is, however, a 
literature that focuses explicitly on interactions between countries in a context 
of endogenous technology development, see  Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994), 
Xepapadeas (1995), Katsoulacos (1997), Buonanno et al. (2003), Rosendahl 
(2002) and Ben Youssef (2003). 
 
Two papers by Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2004) 
are particularly relevant for the issues discussed in the present paper. In both 
papers it is assumed that there are technology spillovers between countries, but 
that free riding countries to some extent can be excluded from these spillovers. 
The issue in Carraro and Marchiori (2003) is whether or not negotiations on 
R&D cooperation and on emissions reductions should be linked. They derive 
conditions under which a linkage of these two issues is an equilibrium of the 
negotiation game. Buchner and Carraro (2004) use a numerical model to study 
the properties of an agreement only on R&D cooperation, and not explicitly on 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Carraro (1998), Fischer (2000), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Goulder and Schneider (1999), 
Nordhaus (2000) and Rasmussen (2001).   3
emissions reductions. They show that if a sufficiently large part of the 
technology spillovers can be limited to the cooperating countries, all countries 
will wish to participate in the R&D agreement. However, the numerical model 
used suggests that the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions will be higher 
under such an agreement than in the case of no cooperation. 
 
 
None of the articles listed above focus explicitly, however, on how the design 
of an international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions might affect the 
incentives for technology development. This is one of the issues treated in 
Golombek and Hoel (2003), where it is assumed that R&D investments in each 
country are beneficial also for other countries through technology spillovers
2. 
Various types of non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes are studied. In 
particular, the paper compares different types of climate agreements that 
regulate emissions, but don’t include policies towards R&D investments. The 
justification for this limitation of the agreements, which is in contrast to what is 
assumed in Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2004), is 
that policies affecting R&D expenditures are difficult to verify by other 
countries. If a country is required - through an international agreement - to have 
more R&D expenditures than what is individually optimal for the country, it 
will be relatively easy for the country to have less R&D than required by the 
agreement, but to report other expenditures and/or other policies as R&D 
activities/policies. 
 
In Golombek and Hoel (2003) it is assumed that R&D expenditures in each 
country are controlled directly by the government. This assumption reflects that 
the incentives for any particular firm to undertake R&D expenditures are weak 
due to technology spillovers – both between countries and between domestic 
firms. The government must therefore finance the R&D activities, even though 
                                                 
2 This feature is present also in several of the studies referred to above, although these contributions do 
not treat the same issues as Golombek and Hoel.    4
R&D (primarily) takes place in private firms. The government thus controls 
R&D expenditures through its funding of them. In the present paper we 
explicitly consider this funding. All R&D is assumed to take place in private 
firms, but the R&D investments are subsidized by the government. The 
purpose of the present paper is therefore to study climate policy when R&D 
takes place in private firms and there are technology spillovers between 
countries, but there is no instrument to correct for these international 
externalities. In particular, we compare the properties of different types of 
international climate agreements when the positive externalities from R&D are 
not regulated through the climate agreement. By explicitly modeling R&D 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model 
in more detail. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we use a 
static framework, thus ignoring, for example, the fact that GHG emissions are 
stock pollutants. We also consider only one type of GHG, namely CO2. None 
of our results are affected by this simplification. Moreover, all types of 
uncertainties – like the rate of return on R&D investments - are disregarded. 
Finally, all countries are assumed identical, and all firms within each country 
are also identical. While this of course is a drastic simplification, the analysis 
nevertheless gives insight that is relevant also in the real world. 
 
In Section 3 we consider the first-best social optimum. This gives a particular 
abatement level, and a particular level of R&D investments in each firm. This 
outcome could be implemented through an ideal international agreement that 
sets a common carbon tax to be used in all countries, as well as a common 
subsidy rate for R&D investments for all firms in all countries. 
 
                                                 
3 Our results are given in 12 propositions. Of these, it is only the result in Proposition 6 that also was 
derived in Golombek and Hoel (2003), as Proposition 9 of that paper.    5
Sections 4-6 consider three types of international agreements that regulate 
emissions, but don’t include policies towards R&D investments (the 
justification for this limitation of the agreements was given above). Sections 4 
and 5 consider an international agreement controlling abatements directly 
through emission quotas. In our simple model with identical countries, it makes 
no difference whether quotas are non-tradable (Section 4) or tradable (Section 
5). We show that the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower than the socially 
optimal subsidy if there are technology spillovers across countries. The 
equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not specify 
emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax faced by all 
firms in all countries (Section 6).  
 
In the model there are 3 levels of decision makers; (i) the group of all countries 
in the world, (ii) each country and (iii) firms. In Section 4-6 we study the 
optimal policy of a country when the climate agreement is taken as given and 
the country takes into account how domestic and foreign firms will respond to 
its policy decisions. In Section 7-9 we study the optimal design of climate 
agreements. We assume that all types of agreements are designed by the group 
of all countries in order to minimize total social costs, given how countries will 
respond to the climate agreement (and how firms will respond to the policy 
decisions of countries).  
 
In Sections 7 and 8 we study how strictly emissions should be regulated in the 
climate agreement. For the quota case, emissions should be regulated so that 
marginal abatement costs are higher than the sum of marginal environmental 
costs in all countries. In the case of an emission tax agreement, it is not obvious 
whether the common emission tax should be higher or lower than the sum of 
marginal environmental costs. Under a reasonable assumption about the 
abatement cost function, however, the common emission tax should be lower 
than the sum of marginal environmental costs. With this condition on the cost 
function we also find that the levels of abatement and R&D investments are   6
lower under the optimal tax agreement than under the optimal quota agreement. 
Under the tax agreement the levels of abatement and R&D investments are also 
lower than in the first-best optimum. 
 
Section 9 compares total social costs of climate agreements. The second-best 
agreements will necessarily have higher social costs than the first-best 
outcome. We show that total social costs are higher in the tax case than in the 
quota case. Finally, Section 10 sums up our main findings and points at topics 
for future research.  
 
2   The model  
We assume there are m firms in each of n countries. All firms are identical and 
undertake R&D investments. As a simplification, we neglect uncertainties and 
dynamic aspects of R&D as well as patents. We assume the technology level of 
a particular domestic firm depends on its own R&D investments  (X), the 
amount of R&D investments in the other firms in that country (x), as well as 




Technology diffusion is not perfect. For a representative domestic firm, only 
part ( 1 γ < ) of the R&D investments undertaken in the other domestic firms are 
beneficial for the firm. Similarly, only part (
* γ γ ≤ ) of the R&D investments 
undertaken in foreign firms are beneficial for the domestic firm. The 
technology level of a representative domestic firm is thus given by 
 
 
** (1 ) ( 1 ) YXm xn m x γ γ =+− +−  (1) 
 
In (1) we have assumed an additive structure of technology spillovers, that is, 
the technology level of a firm depends on the sum of R&D investments 
                                                 
4 With identical firms, R&D investments may be equal in all firms in equilibrium. However, in order to 
find the equilibrium it is expedient to distinguish between the amount of R&D investments undertaken 
in a particular domestic firm, in other domestic firms and in foreign firms.   7
undertaken in all forms, corrected by the technology diffusion parameters (γ  
and 
* γ ). This way of modeling spillovers can be found in a wide range of 
theoretical and empirical contributions, and goes back at least to Spence 
(1984). It is also used in the literature refereed to above on climate policy in the 
context of interactions between countries and endogenous technology 
development. In this literature there is no explicit modeling of knowledge 
spillovers within each country, but spillovers across countries are modeled as in 
(1). The assumptions used by Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994) and Xepapadeas 
(1995) correspond to the limiting case of  *1 γ = , while the assumptions used by 
e.g. Buonanno et al. (2000, 2003) and Rosendahl (2002) correspond to  *1 γ < . 
 
Although spillovers often are modeled as in (1), it is not obvious that this is the 
best way of modeling technology spillovers between firms and countries. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have argued that the ability of a firm to learn from 
other firms may depend on its own R&D effort. Graevenitz (2002) discusses 
the policy implications of whether one models spillovers additively as in (1) or 
in a similar way as Cohen and Levinthal suggest. We shall stick to the 
“standard” formulation (1). 
 
The technology level of a particular foreign firm (
* Y ) is determined in a similar 
way as (1): 
 
 
** * * * * (1 ) (2 ) YXm xnm x m x γ γγ =+− + − +  (2) 
 
In (2) the first term is R&D investment in the particular foreign firm, the 
second term shows the spillover effect from the other (“foreign”) firms in the 
same country, the third term shows the spillover effect from all other foreign 
firms, whereas the last term shows the spillover effect from the “domestic” 
firms.  
   8
With identical firms, business as usual (BAU) emissions are equal across firms, 
and normalized to 1. Let A, a and 
* a  be abatement in a particular domestic 
firm, in the other domestic firms and in foreign firms, respectively. For 
domestic firms, emissions are then given by 1 a − .  
 
Each firm is faced by three types of costs; abatement costs, R&D expenditures 
and emission costs (which may be emission taxes or a price for tradable 
emission quotas). For all firms, abatement costs are assumed to depend both on 
the level of abatement and the technology level of the firm. Hence, for 
domestic firms, costs of abatement are represented by  (,) cay, where 
0 c
a a c ∂
∂ ′ => ,  0 aa c′′ > ,  0 y c′ < ,  0 yy c′′ > ,  0 ay c′′ <  and 
2 () 0 aa yy ay cc c ′′ ′′ ′′ − >  (i.e. the c 
function is strictly convex). The price of R&D investments is normalized to 
one. However, we assume that the domestic government subsidizes R&D 
investments by the rate σ  (and the governments abroad subsidize R&D 
investments by the rate 
* σ ).
5 Finally, all firms face a cost of carbon emissions, 
which we denote q and 
* q  for domestic and foreign firms, respectively.  
 
A particular domestic firm minimizes its total costs by choosing abatement (A) 
and R&D investments (X). Hence, the firm minimizes 
 
  (,) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) cAY X q A σ + −+ −  (3) 
 
where the second term is net R&D expenditures, the third term is 
environmental costs of the firm, and the technology level Y is given by (1).  All 
(the identical) domestic firms solve a similar problem, and they will thus 
                                                 
5 In our simple model where all R&D investments reduce abatement costs, subsidization of R&D is an 
obvious policy to encourage such investments. In a more complex setting where some types of R&D 
investments might increase BAU emissions, and it is difficult for the regulator to distinguish between 
different types of R&D investments, subsidizing R&D might not be a good policy. See e.g. Lund 
(1994) for a detailed discussion.    9
choose the same values in equilibrium ( A a =  and Yy = ). The first order 
conditions for this problem are thus given by:
6  
 
  (,) a ca y q =  (4) 
  (,) 1 y ca y σ − =−  (5) 
 
Equation (4) is the standard condition for optimal abatement; marginal costs of 
abatement ( a c ) should equal marginal benefit of abatement, which in our model 
equals the price of carbon emissions q.  Further, marginal costs of R&D 
investments (1 σ − ) should equal marginal benefit of these investments 
( 0 y c −> ).  
 





a cay q =  (6) 
  *
** * (,)1
y cay σ − =−  (7) 
 
From (4) and (5) we see that the technology level of domestic firms  y , as well 
as abatement a,  depend on σ  and q, whereas (6) and (7) show that the 
technology level of foreign firms 
* y , as well as abatement 
* a , depend on 
* σ  
and 
* q ; 
 
  (,) yy q σ =  (8) 
  (,) aa q σ =  (9) 
 
** * * (,) yy q σ =  (10) 
 
** * * (,) aa q σ =  (11) 
                                                 
6 Throughout the paper, we assume interior equilibrium outcomes for a and x, which will be the case 
for suitable assumptions on the function c(a,y).  
   10
  
It follows from the properties of the abatement cost function that all of these 
four functions are increasing in both their arguments.  
 
As both y and 
* y  depend on R&D investments undertaken in all countries, see 
(1) and (2), we have (using X=x and X*=x*) 
 
 
** (, ,, ) x xq q σσ =  (12) 
 
** * * (, ,, ) x xq q σσ =  (13) 
 
Hence, if the domestic government changes its R&D subsidy, R&D 
investments will be affected in all (domestic and foreign) firms, and the 
technology level of domestic firms will change.  Note, however, that the 
technology level of foreign firms will not change since for a foreign firm costs 
of production, that is, costs of R&D investments and the price of carbon, have 
not changed, see (10). Similarly, a change in the foreign R&D subsidy will 
affect R&D investments in all (domestic and foreign) firms as well as the 
technology level of foreign firms, but has no impact on the technology level of 
domestic firms.  
 
For the proceeding analysis, it is useful to have an explicit expression for (12). 
This follows from  (1) and (2) (and X=x,  X*=x*, Y=y and Y*=y*): 
 





(1 ) ( )
1( 1 )













1 * 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) Hm n m γγ
−
  =+ − +−    (16) 
   11
The following properties can be derived from the expressions above: 
−  H and h are both positive 
−  H is lower than h if there are spillovers across countries 
−  H is equal to h if there are no spillovers across countries (γ*=0) 
−  H and h are both equal to 1 if there are no spillovers (γ=γ*=0) 
−  H and h are both decreasing in γ 
−  H is decreasing in γ* 
−  h is increasing in γ* 
−  H is smaller than 1 
−  h is smaller than 1 if γ* is sufficiently small relative to γ, but may be larger 
than 1 if  γ* is sufficiently close to γ 
7 
 
3 The first-best social optimum 
In the first best optimum, all the (mn) identical firms have the same level of 
abatement (a) as well as identical amounts of R&D investments (x). Total 
social costs (for a given total emission level) are therefore given by total costs 
of abatement and R&D investments, that is, 
 
  [(, ) ] mn c a y x +  (17) 
 
Relation (17) is minimized with respect to x subject to the definition of 
technology level, which can now be written as (see (14) for the case of 
* yy = ) 
 
  x Hy =  (18) 
where H is given by (16). 
 
For given abatements, the first order condition for the first-best optimum is  
                                                 
7 For γ*=γ we find  []
1 2 1( 1 ) 1( 2 ) ( 1 ) h nm m nm nm γγ γ
−










.   12
 
  y cH − =  (19) 
 
Rewriting this as 
1 1 y cH
− −=  gives a straightforward interpretation: The 




− − ) should equal marginal costs of R&D investments. Using (5) 
together with (19) we see that the social optimum can be implemented by 
imposing the subsidy  
 
  1 H σ = −   (20) 
 
on all firms. We immediately see from (20) and the properties of H that the 
optimal subsidy is zero for the special case of no spillovers (γ=γ*=0). 
Moreover, the optimal subsidy is larger the larger are the diffusion parameters 
γ  and 
* γ : 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal subsidy of R&D investments is higher the greater 
are the technology spillovers within countries and across countries.  
 
The intuition of Proposition 1 is straightforward; the higher the rate of 
diffusion, the more beneficial are R&D investments in one firm for all other 
firms. As the social return on R&D investments increases, the optimal level of 
R&D investments increases, which requires a higher technology subsidy. 
Finally, note that the subsidy is constant, and hence independent of the 
abatement level a as well as the technology level y. This is due to H in (20) 
being independent of both a and y, which reflects the additive structure of (1).  
 
   13
4   An international agreement on abatement 
In this section we assume there is an international agreement that specifies 
abatement levels in all countries. These levels are implemented through 
country specific emission taxes (or through country specific tradable emission 
quota systems). Hence, (4) and (6) apply in this case, with q and 
* q  being the 
emission tax (or more generally, the price of carbon) imposed on domestic and 
foreign firms, respectively.  
 
As discussed in Section 2, a shift in the domestic technology subsidy σ  will 
have impact on R&D investments in all (domestic and foreign) firms, as well as 
the technology level of domestic firms. The domestic government minimizes 
total domestic social costs 
 
  [(, ) ] mcay x +  (21) 
 
with respect to the technology subsidy σ  (see (8) - (13)), taking a as given.
8 
The first order condition is (using (8) and (14) and the equilibrium conditions 
** ,, Xx X x Yy == =  and 
** Yy =  in addition to the fact that 
* y  is not affected 
by a change in  σ , cf. the discussion above)  
 
 














 is positive, 
  y ch − =  (23) 
 
                                                 
8  Strictly speaking, the government minimizes  [(, ) ] mcay x +  subject to q  and σ , given that the 
domestic abatement level ma follows from the agreement.   14
Using (5), the optimal domestic technology level can be implemented through 
the technology subsidy σ , which is characterized by 
 
  1 h σ = −  (24) 
 
From (20) and (24) and the properties of h we have the following results:  
 
Proposition 2: With an international agreement on abatement, the equilibrium 
subsidy of R&D investments is higher the greater are the technology spillovers 
within countries and lower the greater are the technology spillovers across 
countries. For sufficiently large spillovers across countries, the equilibrium 
subsidy may be negative, i.e R&D investments may be taxed. 
 
The intuition of the first part of Proposition 2, that larger domestic spillovers 
imply a higher subsidy, is obvious. The intuition on the relationship between 
the strength of spillovers across countries and the subsidy is as follows: With 
international spillovers (and abatement given by the international agreement), 
the technology level of a foreign firm depends only on the foreign technology 
subsidy 
* σ (cf. (10)). Hence, if domestic firms, cet. par., increase their R&D 
investments, foreign firms will reduce their R&D investments so that their 
technology level is unchanged.
9 Reduced R&D investments abroad will lower 
the technology level of domestic firms through technology diffusion, and hence 
lower the domestic return on R&D investments. As the leakage tends to 
decrease the domestic technology level, the domestic technology subsidy 
should be reduced. With no international spillovers, there is no leakage, and 
hence the incentive to increase domestic R&D investments is higher, that is, the 
technology subsidy is greatest in the case of no international technology 
diffusion. If on the other hand international spillovers are sufficiently large, 
each county has a strong incentive to reduce its own R&D investments, thereby 
                                                 
9  While this effect might be termed a 100 per cent leakage, the reduction in R&D investments of a 
foreign firm relative to the increase in domestic R&D investments depends on the number of domestic 
and foreign firms, as well as the diffusion parameters γ  and 
* γ .   15
increasing R&D investments in other countries, which it benefits from. 
Therefore a tax on R&D investments (corresponding to h>1) might be an 
optimal policy from the perspective of each individual country.  
 
From (19) and (23), and the properties of H and h, we also have the following 
result: 
 
Proposition 3: With an international agreement on abatement, the equilibrium 
subsidy of R&D investments is equal to the first-best optimal subsidy if there 
are no technology spillovers across countries. If there are technology 
spillovers across countries, the equilibrium subsidy is lower than the first-best 
optimal subsidy.  
 
As noted above, when abatements are given and there is international 
technology diffusion, in the non-cooperative equilibrium increased domestic 
R&D investments are offset by decreased R&D investments in foreign firms. In 
the first best optimum, the full social effect of R&D investments are taken into 
account, and hence the optimal technology level is higher in the first best case 
than in the non-cooperative case. Thus, the technology subsidy should be 
highest in the first best optimum. Without international spillover effects, there 
is no leakage in the non-cooperative equilibrium, and hence the technology 
level, as well as the subsidy, should not differ between the first best optimum 
and the non-cooperative equilibrium.  
 
 
5 International tradable emission quotas 
In this section we assume that all countries have signed an international climate 
agreement of the Kyoto type. The agreement specifies the initial distribution of 
emission quotas between countries, but allows countries to buy or sell quotas 
from/to other countries. The agreement imposes no restrictions on how the 
country sets its technology subsidy (or other environmental instruments). The   16
agreement only dictates that emissions should not exceed the country’s quotas 
(i.e. initial endowment adjusted for quotas purchased or sold). 
 
Let  E be total emission quotas given to the “domestic” country. We assume 
that an international market for quotas is established, with an equilibrium price 
p for quotas. Obviously, the quota price will be lower the more quotas are 
given to the countries.  
 
The domestic country minimizes 
 
  [(, ) ] [ ( 1 ) ] mcay x pm a E + +− −  (25) 
 
with respect to abatement a and technology subsidy σ . In (25) the last term 
shows net environmental costs as [( 1 ) ] ma E − −  is the country’s net purchase of 
quotas. Because all countries are identical, also with respect to the initial 
distribution of emission quotas, in equilibrium net purchase of quotas is zero 
for all countries. Hence, even if the number of identical countries is so low that 
each country can be considered to be “large” (that is, the country takes into 
account that the quota price depends on its own decisions), for each country 
[( 1 ) ] [( 1 ) ]0
dp dp
ma E ma E
da dσ
−−= −−=  in equilibrium. 
 
The first order condition with respect to abatement is 
 
  (,) a ca y p =  (26) 
 
that is, marginal costs of abatement ( a c ) should equal marginal benefit of 
abatement, which equals the price of quotas p (increased abatement reduces net 
purchase of quotas). The optimal abatement level can be implemented e.g. 
through a carbon tax imposed on all domestic firms, see (4), where the price of 
carbon q should equal the quota price p.    17
 
As in the case of an international agreement on abatement (see Section 3), the 
first order condition with respect to the technology subsidy is given by (22), 





 as before is positive, so that (23) is valid also in the present 
case. Hence, the technology subsidy does not differ between the present case 
and the case of an international agreement on abatement. 
 
With both types of agreements, R&D investments are determined according to 
(5) and (7), that is, investments depend on the technology subsidy, which has 
the same value in the two cases, and investments are also dependent on 
abatement. Hence, if abatements (at the firm level) do not differ between the 
two types of agreements, R&D investments will be equal under the two 
agreements. We have thus shown the following:  
 
Proposition 4: The equilibrium subsidy of R&D investments does not differ 
between an agreement on abatement and an agreement with tradable quotas. If 
abatements at the firm level are equal in the two cases, R&D investments are 
also equal, that is, the two agreements are isomorphic.    
 
With both types of agreements, the technology subsidy of a country has impact 
on R&D investments in all (domestic and foreign) firms, as well as the 
technology level of the country, see (8) - (13). However, there is no direct 
relation between the technology subsidy and total abatement/emissions of a 
country. Under an agreement on abatement, the agreement dictates national 
abatements levels (and hence the national emissions levels as BAU emissions 
are constant). With tradable emission quotas, national emissions follow solely 
from the choice of abatement. Because the technology subsidy is determined in 
the same way in the two cases, the subsidy is equal under the two types of 
agreements.  
   18
 
6  A harmonized domestic carbon tax 
In the previous section we discussed the case of an agreement with direct limits 
on national emissions. In this section we analyze an agreement that does not 
specify emission levels for the participating countries. Instead, the agreement 
specifies policy instruments that the countries must implement domestically. 
Below we study the case where there is a common domestic carbon tax τ  that 
all countries must implement. We assume that in each country the carbon tax 
revenue of the government is redistributed domestically. 
 
In the previous case, total emissions (aggregated over all participating 
countries) followed directly from the agreement. In the present case, we 
assume that each country determines abatement taking into account 
environmental costs of emissions. For each country, environmental damage D 
depends on the sum of total emissions  (( 1 )( 1 )( 1 * ) ) Dm a n m a − +− − , where the 
damage function is increasing and convex. 
 
The domestic country now minimizes 
 
 
* [ ( , ) ] ( (1 ) ( 1) (1 )) mcay x Dm a n m a ++ −+− −  (27) 
 
with respect to the technology subsidy σ  and the fact that cost of carbon is τ  
for all firms. The last restriction implies that at the firm level abatement follows 
from  
 
  (,) a ca y τ =  (28) 
  
 
The first order condition with respect to the subsidy is 
   19









where we have used (14) and (28).  
 
From (5) and (29) we find that the equilibrium subsidy  ˆ σ  now is given by 
 










′ =−− −  (30) 
 
Consider the last term in (30). Without any agreement this  term would be zero: 
the (domestic) tax rate would be equal to the marginal benefit of abatement D′. 
However, in the present case the common tax rate τ  will in general be higher 











 are positive, see the discussion after equations (8)-(11) 
.The last term in (30) is therefore negative. Comparing with (24) it therefore 




We have thus shown the following:  
 
Proposition 5: The equilibrium subsidy of R&D investments under a 
harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower than the corresponding subsidy under 
an agreement on abatement/tradable emission quotas. 
 
The interpretation of this result is directly linked to the first term in (29). The 
common tax rate τ  will in general be higher than the tax rate the country 
would have chosen without any agreement. Hence, the level of abatement is   20
distorted away from the country’s ideal choice. Because the term () D τ ′ −  is 
positive, and since increased R&D increases abatement, increased R&D also 
increases this distortion. This gives each country a smaller incentive to 
subsidize R&D investments than when such investments have no effect on the 
countries’ abatement levels.  
 
 
7 The second-best optimal price of carbon 
So far, we have considered different types of agreements, without saying 
anything about how abatement levels are determined. We have shown that 
whatever the abatement level and tax rate is, the equilibrium subsidy of R&D 
investments is lower in a tax agreement than in a quota agreement. Moreover, 
under both types of agreements the equilibrium subsidies are lower than in the 
first-best optimum. In this section we shall investigate whether this property of 
both agreements should affect what the optimal quota/tax should be in the two 
types of agreements. Whatever the type of agreement, we assume that the 
agreement is designed (by the group of signatories) in order to minimize total 
social costs aggregated over all identical firms, that is,   
 
  [(, ) ] ( ( 1 ) ) mn c a y x nD mn a + +−  (31) 
 
is minimized. Let us first consider the first best optimum, that is, (31) is 
minimized with respect to abatement a and x, subject to (18). The first order 
condition is, in addition to (19) 
  a cn D ′ =  (32) 
 
which is the standard requirement that marginal costs of abatement should 
equal total marginal benefit of abatement. Hence, from a first best perspective 
the price of carbon in an agreement should equal total marginal benefits of 
abatement nD′.  
   21
According to Propositions 3 and 5, the subsidies under both types of second-
best agreements (since R&D subsidies are not included in the agreement) are 
lower than the subsidy in the first best case (assuming positive technology 
spillovers across countries). Should the second-best agreement therefore be 
designed so that the price of carbon is higher than the optimal tax in the first 
best optimum (to adjust for the difference in the R&D subsidy)? To answer 
this, we must consider the two types of agreements separately. 
 
Consider first the quota agreement. In this case the common technology level 
in all countries is determined by (23), which give y as an increasing function of 
a: y=y(a). In the minimization of (31) with respect to a we must now take into 
account that y=y(a) and x=Hy(a) (from (18)). Instead of (32) we therefore now 
get 
 
  () ' ( ) ay cn DcH y an D ′ ′ = −+ >  (33) 
 
where the inequality sign follows from  0 y′ >  and (for γ*>0) 
0 yy cH ch +<+ = (from (23)). We thus have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: In an optimally designed quota agreement of the type discussed 
in Sections 4 and 5, the abatement level is set so that the price of carbon (i.e., 
the marginal abatement cost) exceeds the sum of the marginal environmental 
costs. 
 
We next turn to the case of a tax agreement of the type discussed in Section 6. 
In this case the abatement level is endogenously determined in each country by 
equation (28). We can write this as  (,) aa y τ = where  τ is considered as 
exogenous by each country, while each country chooses its level of y (which in 
equilibrium will be the same for all countries) through its choice of the subsidy 
rate  σ. From the properties of the abatement cost function it follows that   22
(,) aa y τ = is increasing in both arguments. The first order condition (29) may 










∂ ′ − ++ =
∂
 (34) 
The optimal value of y (and therefore also the subsidy rate σ) will obviously 
depend on the common tax rate τ. We saw above that when the agreement 
directly specified the abatement level, y was larger the larger was a. We might 
therefore expect that in the present case y is increasing in τ. This is, however, 
not necessarily the case. In Appendix 1 we show the following: 
 
Proposition 7: The equilibrium level of R&D investments under a harmonized 




















is a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium level of 
R&D investments to be increasing in the tax rate. 
 








 is positive if the rightward shift, measured horizontally, in 
the marginal abatement cost curve is larger the higher up on this curve we are 
initially.
 10 This seems to be more plausible than the opposite case. We should 
therefore expect less R&D investments the higher is the common tax rate.  
 
                                                 


















 for e.g.  (,) cay K ay
α β − = , where we must have  10 α β >+ >  in order 
to meet the imposed properties on the cost function (see Section 2).   23
Notice also that if R&D investments are reduced as a response to a higher tax, 
the subsidy rate must also be lower the higher is the tax. This follows 
immediately from  
equations (8)-(11) and the discussion after these. If the common tax rate goes 
up, and as a response to this all countries either leave their R&D subsidies 
unchanged or increase their subsidies, both abatement and technology levels 
will increase in all countries. A higher technology level in all countries requires 
increased R&D in all countries, which contradicts that R&D investments are 
reduced as a response to a higher tax. 
 
The reason why countries might respond to an increased common carbon tax 
by reducing their R&D subsidies is related to with the discussion after 
Proposition 5: A higher common carbon tax increases each country’s distortion 
of its abatement level away from its ideal choice. Reducing R&D subsidies 
reduces abatement (cet. par.), and therefore mitigates this increased distortion.  
 
For an optimal quota agreement, the marginal abatement cost was higher than 
the sum of marginal environmental costs. The reason for this was that higher 
abatement gave more R&D investments. For a tax agreement we should 
therefore expect that if a higher tax gives lower abatement, the optimal tax 
should be lower than the sum of marginal environmental costs. This is indeed 
the case. The optimal tax is found by minimizing (31) with respect to τ  after 
inserting  (,) aa y τ = and  () yy τ =  and x=Hy(τ).
11  The first order condition is  
 
(,) (,) () ()
() () 0 y











                                                 
11  Note that (31) does not distinguish between domestic and foreign firms. We can use this expression  
because with a common price of carbon the response to a change in an instrument does not differ 
between domestic and foreign firms.    24

























Since  (,) aa y τ = is increasing in its arguments and H<h, the large fraction is 





. Combining this 
result with Proposition 7 therefore gives the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 8: In an optimally designed tax agreement of the type discussed in 
Section 6, the common emission tax (equal to the marginal abatement cost) is 





















is a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal 




8 Second best abatement and technology levels 
In the previous section we found the optimal price of carbon under a quota 
agreement and under a harmonized domestic carbon tax. We showed that under 
a quota agreement the price of carbon should exceed the sum of the marginal 
environmental costs, that is, the Pigovian level. On the other hand, with a 











). In this section we compare abatement and   25
technology levels in the two types of agreement, and also compare these with 
the first-best social optimum.  
 
From Proposition 5 we know that the equilibrium subsidy of R&D investments 
under a harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower than the corresponding 
subsidy under an agreement on tradable emission quotas. Moreover, it follows 
from Proposition 6 and 8 that the price of carbon is lower under a harmonized 











). Because both abatement and technology level are 
increasing in the technology subsidy and the price of carbon, see the discussion 
after equations (8)-(11), we have demonstrated the following:  
 










. Then abatement and technology 
level are lower under a harmonized domestic carbon tax than under an 
agreement on tradable emission quotas. In addition, R&D investments are 
lower under a harmonized domestic carbon tax than under an agreement on 
tradable emission quotas. 
 
Note that the last part of Proposition 9 follows directly from the first part 
because lower technology level in all firms implies lower R&D investments in 
all (identical) firms.  
 
We now compare the outcome of the international agreements with the first-
best social optimum. Proposition 3 and 5 imply that the equilibrium subsidy of 
R&D investments under a harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower than the 
first-best optimal subsidy. Moreover, from Proposition 8 we know that the 
price of carbon under a harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower than the first-










. Because   26
both abatement and technology level are increasing in the technology subsidy 
and the price of carbon, we have demonstrated the following:  
 










. Then abatement and technology 
level are lower under a harmonized domestic carbon tax than in the first-best 
social optimum. In addition, R&D investments are lower under a harmonized 
domestic carbon tax than in the first-best social optimum. 
 
As mentioned above, we have showed that under a quota agreement the price 
of carbon should exceed the Pigovian level, see Proposition 6. Moreover, from 
Proposition 3 we know that the equilibrium subsidy under quotas is lower than 
in the first-best optimum (provided there are technology spillovers across 
countries). Because both abatement and technology level are increasing in the 
technology subsidy and the price of carbon, it is not obvious how abatement 
and technology levels are in the optimal quota agreement compared with the 
first-best levels. In Appendix 2 we show the following:  
 
Proposition 11:  If international technology spillovers are positive but 
sufficiently small, technology levels, and thus also R&D investments, are lower 
under a quota agreement than in the first-best optimum. The abatement level in 




9 Social costs of second-best climate agreements 
In the previous two sections, we have compared the two types of international 
agreements, provided both are (second-best) optimally designed. We also 
compared both types of agreements with the first-best optimum. Obviously, 
both types of second-best climate agreements give higher social costs than the 
first-best outcome. We have, however, not yet discussed which of the two types   27
of second-best agreements give the lowest total costs. Given the results in the 
two previous sections, the comparison of total costs is easily illustrated by 






In this Figure, the iso-welfare curves stand for the negative of total costs. The 
highest obtainable welfare (i.e. lowest possible costs) is given by the common 
abatement and technology level corresponding to F(irst best) in Figure 1.The 
curve (19) is given by equation (19): It tells us which technology level 
maximizes social welfare given any abatement level. Clearly, this curve must 
go through all vertical tangents to the iso-welfare curves. Moving outwards 
along (19) in the northeast direction is like hiking along a ridge that drops off 
directly north and directly south. The position of this ridge is independent of 
the environmental damage function D. However, the position of the summit 
(given by F in Figure 1), and also the steepness along the ridge to both sides of 
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Consider next a quota agreement. The relationship between abatement and 
technology level for such an agreement is given by equation (23). Since h>H 
when there are international technology spillovers, the line defined by (23) 
must lie below the line defined by (19). The highest possible social welfare 
obtainable given that we must lie on (23) is given by the point Q(uota) in 
Figure 1, and must obviously give a lower welfare level than the point F. We 
have drawn the curves so that Q lies below F, which must be the case if 
international spillovers are sufficiently low (cf. Proposition 11). In the Figure, 
Q lies to the right of F, but it follows from Proposition 11 that the opposite is 
also possible. 
 
Finally, consider a tax agreement. The relationship between abatement and 
technology level for such an agreement is given by equation (29), which may 













The right-hand side is larger than h, cf. the discussion after (30). It follows that 
the line defined by (29) must lie below the line defined by (29).
 12 The highest 
possible social welfare obtainable given that we must lie on (29) is given by the 
point T(ax) in Figure 1, and must obviously give a lower welfare level than the 
point Q. We have drawn the curves so that T lies below and to the left of F and 










 (cf. Propositions 9 and 10). 
 
To summarize, we have shown the following: 
 
                                                 
12 Notice that while the curves defined by (19) and (23) for certain are rising in Figure 1, this is not 
obvious for the curve defined by (29).   29
Proposition 12: If there are international technology spillovers, total social 
costs are higher under an optimally designed tax agreement of the type 
discussed in Section 6 than they are under an optimally designed quota 
agreement of the type discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Both types of agreements 
have higher total social costs than the first-best outcome.  
 
 
10 Concluding remarks 
We have studied two types of international climate agreements that do not 
include R&D policies. Without international technology spillovers, these 
agreements would be equivalent, and both could give the first-best outcome. In 
the presence of international technology spillovers, it is not possible to reach 
the first-best outcome with either of these agreements. One reason is that the 
R&D subsidies that are optimal for an individual country under an agreement 
are too low compared with the subsidies that must be imposed in order to reach 
the first-best outcome. 
 
Although both types of agreements are inferior compared with the first-best 
outcome, under an optimally designed quota agreement global emissions may 
be lower than in the first-best outcome. Under an optimally designed tax 
agreement, emissions are – under a reasonable assumption - higher than under 
a quota agreement and higher than in the first-best outcome. 
  
We concluded that with optimally designed agreements a quota agreement was 
preferable to a tax agreement as the first gives lower social costs. Compared 
with the tax agreement, the quota agreement has higher R&D subsidies and 
(under a reasonable assumption) higher abatement. 
 
Our results suggest that with international spillovers, there is a social loss of 
not including R&D policies in an international climate agreement. In the 
Introduction, we argued that one reason for not including R&D policies in an   30
agreement is difficulties in monitoring compliance of this element of an 
agreement. However, even if it is difficult or impossible to design a first-best 
type of agreement, our results suggest that agreements where R&D policies are 
included in an imperfect manner may be superior to agreements that ignore 
R&D policies. Moreover, the implicit assumption in our model that there are no 
problems with monitoring and/or compliance with respect to policy instruments 
and emissions is obviously also a simplification. Some economists, including 
Barrett (2003), have argued that traditional agreements of the quota type 
discussed in the present paper are inherently flawed, due to large free rider 
incentives. Barrett argues (op.cit, chapter 15) that agreements that to a larger 
degree focus on the development of new technology might be more likely to be 
successful than traditional quota type agreements.
13 
 
An interesting topic for future research would be to examine various types of 
agreements that include R&D policies under imperfect monitoring or 
incomplete compliance. In such a study it is important how the development of 
new technology is modeled. While we in the present paper have used the 
standard assumption of additive spillovers, a more sophisticated modeling 
would be to e.g. assume that for each firm spillovers from other firms have 
“decreasing returns” or that for each firm the benefits of R&D investments in 
other firms depend on the magnitude of its own R&D investments. The 




Appendix 1:  The relationship between R&D investment and the common 
carbon tax rate 
Denote the left hand side of (34) by  (( , ) ) LL y τ = . We have 
                                                 
















The denominator of this expression is positive from the second order 
conditions.  
 
Remembering that the environmental cost is  (( 1 )( 1 )( 1 * ) ) Dm a n m a − +− − , it 
follows from (34) that 
 
( ) ()
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 (38) 
 
The effect of a tax change on abatement in other countries is identical to the 
effect on abatement of the country we are considering, i.e. the sum of the direct 
effect and the effect via the technology level: 
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We can therefore rewrite (38) as (simplifying by writing a instead of  (,) ayτ ): 
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From (28) we have 
















, which imply that the second term in square brackets 
in (40) is zero. Using (38) we therefore have  
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Since the term in square brackets is positive,  ' D τ > , and  (,) ayτ is increasing in 
both arguments, Proposition 7 immediately follows. 
 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 11 
We know that if h=H, which will be the case if there are no international 
spillovers, the optimal quota agreement is identical to the first-best optimum. If 
we can identify in what direction abatement and technology levels change as h 
is increased (h>H when there are international spillovers), we therefore know 




The optimal quota agreement is given by (23) and (33). Combining these we 
obtain 
 
  (,) ' ( ( 1 ) ) ( )(,) a ca y n Dm n a hH a y φ = −+ −  (43) 
 
                                                 
14 An increase in h, while keeping H unchanged, is accomplished through a suitable increase in 
* γ  and 
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22 () ' ' ( ) ( ) aa yy ay yy y ay a yy Dc cc m n D c h H c c φφ =− + + − −  (47) 
 
The first two terms in D are positive, and will dominate the last term as long as 
h-H is sufficiently small. From (46) and our assumptions on the functions D 
and c it is therefore clear that as h increases, y will decline. This will be true at 
least for h close to H (but might also hold when h-H is large). As long as the 
international spillovers are sufficiently small, h-H will be small, so we can 
conclude that in this case the technology levels y are lower in the quota 
agreement than in the first-best optimum. Moreover, it follows directly from 
(45) that since we do not generally know the sign of  y φ , we do not know 
whether abatement levels under the quota agreement are lower or higher than in 
the first-best optimum. This concludes the proof of Proposition 11. 
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